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Abstract  
This research explores the distribution of executive remuneration based on the type of industry 
and job family in South African state-owned enterprises. A regression analysis of secondary 
data collected on 222 executives was conducted. The overall results based on pairwise 
comparison suggest that the distribution of executive remuneration across various categories 
of industry was the same except between forestry – defence, forestry – telecommunications, 
defence – telecommunications, and energy – development funding. However, the results also 
indicated that there was no difference in the distribution of remuneration across various 
categories of job families in South African state-owned enterprises.  







A basic goal for every employer is to determine how salaries compare with those of employers 
that are seen as competitors for talent and to adjust the pay programme periodically to maintain 
the planned alignment (Risher, 2012). However, it would be difficult to decide on the 
magnitude of pay differentials for different occupations without addressing the design, sector 
and industry, job function and external equity against which such remuneration could be 
benchmarked (Bizjak, Lemmon & Naveen, 2008; Bizjak, Lemmon, & Nguyen, 2011; Chatterji, 
Mumford & Smith, 2011; Ghose, 2011; Greckhammer, 2011; Perkins & White, 2011). 
The design of compensation schemes is a key factor that affects behaviour and awareness of 
acting in accordance with the overriding aims of the public authority. Scholars in public 
administration, political science and economics have written that the distinctive characteristics 
of public organisations and the people in them have significant implications for public 
administration and for governance (Bullock, Stritch & Rianey, 2015). Whenever 
astronomically high pay of chief executive officers (CEOs) was highlighted in the media, the 
obvious question was whether executives were justified in accumulating massive wealth 
through remuneration (Sarkar, 2013).  
Recent developments have shifted away from treating executive remuneration as an internal 
consideration in which only internal equity and job evaluation in an organisation are used to 
determine remuneration (Mcgovern & Williams, 2012). The rise of external influencers, such 
as the industry and the market in which an organisation belongs, seems to contribute to the 
main determinants of executive remuneration.  
Similarly, Perkins and White (2011) argue that commentary in the academic and related 
literature attempting to theorise executive pay and the contingencies against which it is 
determined reveals a range of views. The recent literature of finance (Ang, Nagel & Yang 2013; 
 Bizjak, Lemmon & Naveen, 2008) shows that executive pay is benchmarked against industry 
peers of comparable size. Moreover, Faulkender and Yang (2010) and Bizjak, Lemmon, and 
Nguyen (2011) show that in addition to industry and size considerations, organisations select 
peer organisations that pay their chief executive (CEOs) more generously to justify CEO pay.  
While much has been mentioned about the employment effects of the privatisation of South 
African state-owned enterprises (SOEs) the debate has largely overlooked the impact of these 
events on wage levels (Hatting, Hodges & Rospabe, 2003). To understand the nature of South 
African SOEs and their implication for executive remuneration, a discussion of the definition 
of such institutions may be necessary.  
SOEs are known by many names – government corporations, government business enterprises, 
government-linked companies, parastatals, public enterprises, public sector units or enterprises 
and so on (PwC, 2015). South African SOEs have not escaped scrutiny with regard to their real 
identity. According to the policy discussion paper on South African SOEs and Development 
Finance Institutions (DFIs) (2012), the area of state-owned entities is awash with acronyms 
and abbreviations, which often leads to definitional confusion. According to the presidential 
review committee on South African SOEs released in 2013, notable observations and findings 
are that South Africa has no common agenda for and understanding of South African SOEs.  
In addition to the absence of a consolidated national repository for all SOEs, there is confusion 
about the categorisation of South African SOEs in terms of whether they should be classified 
as private or public sector organisations. While much has been mentioned about the 
employment effects of the privatisation of South African SOEs, the debate has largely 
overlooked the impact of these events on the wage levels of those workers who retained their 
jobs during the restructuring process (Hatting, Hodges & Rospabe, 2003). The understanding 
then was that a South African SOE would shift to become a partially private firm that would 
 operate in a highly regulated industry structure with limited competition. Over time South 
African SOEs were expected to earn abnormal profits and unionised labour was also going to 
share in some of those profits (Hatting, Hodges & Rospabe, 2003).  
However, according to an ANC policy discussion paper on South African SOEs and DFIs 
published in 2012, South African SOEs were not created to maximise profits or incur losses; 
rather their existence was for the purpose of driving the development agenda. The dual mandate 
of South African SOEs was to achieve a balance between the required level of self-funding and 
undertaking developmental projects that the private sector would ordinarily not do. These 
policies were to ensure that the South African SOEs, tasked with costly development mandates, 
were strategically positioned to generate sufficient revenue to cover the costs associated with 
fulfilling their respective, but interrelated, mandates. What seems to be a challenge though is 
the dual character of South African SOEs as having attributes of both the public and the private 
sector.  
However, it seems that the challenge with defining the sector according to which South African 
SOEs can be categorised is part of a larger confusion between public and private sector 
organisations. As explained by Bullock, Stritch and Rainey (2015), experts and observers (e.g. 
Bozeman, 1987; Musolf & Seidman, 1980) have repeatedly emphasised the “blurring” of the 
public, private, and non-profit sectors. These experts argue that the sectors are mingled and 
overlapping, making simple distinctions impossible. The contexts of organisations, moreover, 
can vary widely within and across nations (Houston 2011; Kjeldsen & Anderson 2013; O'Toole 
& Meier 2015).  
However, the presidential Review Committee (2013) asserts that the name ‘state-owned 
enterprise’ must be used to refer to incorporated and non-incorporated commercial entities, and 
the name ‘public entities’ must be used to refer to all non-commercial entities. In addition, an 
 SOE is regarded as a legal entity created by government to undertake commercial activities on 
behalf of the owner, government. Their legal status could vary, from being part of government 
to being public companies with the state as a shareholder. 
While the varying forms of SOEs may provide governments with flexibility, these multiple 
forms may also serve to complicate ownership policy, make them less transparent and insulate 
SOEs from the legal framework applicable to other companies, including competition laws, 
bankruptcy provisions or securities laws (PwC, 2015). There are also challenges with regard to 
balancing the trade-offs between commercial and non-commercial objectives of South African 
SOEs. 
The multiple forms of SOEs seem to be the cause for debate on maladministration and 
corruption in the management of executive remuneration in SOEs. According to Rodriquez, 
Uhlenbruck and Eden (2005, p.383) the most general definition of corruption is “the abuse of 
public power for private benefit”. Transparency International (2004) has defined corruption as 
the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Similarly, Jain (2001) defines corruption as an 
act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes 
the rules of the game. These definitions explicitly refer to the private gain of all agents involved 
in the corrupt act (Sherman, 1980, p. 480).  
An element of corruption as defined in this study seems to be present to some extent in the 
context of South African SOEs. For example, according to the Transparency International 
report of 2014, South Africa ranks 67th with a score of 44 in a sample of 175 countries in terms 
of perceived corruption. This means that South Africa is perceived to be a fairly corrupt society. 
Some degree of corruption is further substantiated by events and developments in the 
determination of executive remuneration in SOEs, as discussed below. 
 
 Events and developments at an electricity supplier state-owned enterprise 
In 2007, giving a written reply to a parliamentary question from Freedom Front Plus 
parliamentary leader Pieter Groenewald, the Honourable Hogan, then Minister of Public 
Enterprises, in defence of the remuneration package of the electricity supplier SOE’s CEO, 
mentioned that the CEO’s remuneration was similar to the percentage increase awarded to all 
top management employees during the October 2007 annual increase period. However, in April 
2008 the CEO got another 15.31% increase - the median of the market, which according to the 
Minister took the CEO to R4 750 000 on the anniversary of his appointment. Then again in 
October, when the company paid everyone annual increases, the CEO was paid another 8.84%, 
taking his remuneration to R5 170 000 (Fin.24.com, Nov 2009).  
In 2009, the board of the electricity  power supplier rewarded the efforts of the CEO to keep 
South Africa's lights on with a 26.7% salary increase, considerably more than the 10.5% given 
to the rest of the power utility's workforce. The CEO in his defence mentioned that he did not 
bargain for his package but that the board made an assessment and decided what to award. The 
CEO asserted that the board had arrived at the decision after assessing his performance 
(Sowetan, 2009). 
The Minister of Public Enterprises mentioned that pay increases were awarded in terms of the 
SOE's remuneration policy to reward executives “at the median of the market” (Fin24.com, 
July 2010). The statement by the Minister with reference to the median of the market seems to 
suggest that executive compensation within the electricity power supplier SOE was determined 
by external equity, which involves comparing the enterprise's executive remuneration to that 
of other similar organisations in the market. However, from the statements made by the 
Minister, it was not clear to which market the Minister was referring against which it was 
 relevant to benchmark the salary of the CEO, since it concerned the only major supplier of 
electricity in South Africa.  
Furthermore, the Minister explained that subsequent to his appointment, the power supplier 
had changed its remuneration approach for managers from a "salary plus benefits" to a total 
guaranteed package (TGP) basis. Benefits such as a pension fund and medical aid were then 
structured within the TGP. "There are no fixed bonuses," she said. "Bonuses are based on an 
individual's performance over 12 months."  But bizarrely, she listed the first bonus the CEO 
received as a short-term incentive bonus of R1 103 000. It was allocated in March 2007 - a full 
month or more before he was actually officially appointed, although he was made CEO 
designate in February (Fin24.com, July 2010). 
In general, SOE’s executives were awarded an average salary hike of 25% for the 2010 
financial year. That was more than five times the prevailing inflation rate of 4.6% at that time 
(Fin24.com, July 2010). 
Events and developments at an airline state-owned enterprise 
A KPMG report (2010) states that in 2007, at the time when a South African airline enterprise 
was undertaking a substantial exercise of restricting its business, a retention bonus scheme was 
approved, which was intended to incentivise key and critical employees to remain in the 
employ of the airline. A maximum financial cost for the scheme was approved and the 
implementation of the scheme was delegated to the CEO and members of his then executive 
support team.  
However, according to the KPMG report, investigations revealed that retention bonus contracts 
were concluded, by or with the approval of the CEO, for a total amount that in aggregate 
exceeded the maximum financial limit that had been imposed for the scheme in an amount of 
 over R27 million. This excess was not authorised by the board and it was beyond the powers 
of the CEO to expend such monies (KPMG report, 2010). The events at the airline seem to 
indicate that there was no clear-cut guideline on how incentives could be allocated and 
managed within the airline. The question remains, what informed the allocation of such 
incentives? 
Events and developments at a transport logistics utility state-owned enterprise 
According to the Sowetan (2012), the uncertainty that accompanied the clear administration 
and management of executive remuneration saw the Minister of Public Enterprises putting a 
stop to increases in executive pay in all South African SOEs until an effective and efficient 
guideline was in place. The Minister of Public Enterprises was particularly incensed by two 
instances of "excessive executive pay" at one of these parastatals, otherwise known as state-
owned entities in politically correct terms (Sowetan, 16 March 2012).  
The first was a report that a non-executive director at the transport logistics utility enterprise 
had recently earned more than R138 000 for attending only three of five meetings, or R34 500 
a sitting. The second related to the payment of more than R10 million in incentives and bonuses 
to the CEO for the period he was on suspension while allegations of graft were being 
investigated against him (Sowetan, 16 March 2012). The Minister’s frustration demonstrated 
that there was a need for an informed guideline on executive compensation in the context of 
South African SOEs.  
However, in South Africa, the Companies Act of 2008 and the King III provide some guidance 
on corporate governance but do not pronounce explicitly on the governance of SOEs and their 
executive remuneration in particular. It can only be assumed from the legal provisions that 
SOEs as companies are covered. Besides, there seem to be gaps with regard to remuneration 
even in the context of the private sector. For example, referring to King III compliance, 
 Seegers, a partner at PwC, said a major focus area for remuneration committees should be to 
re-evaluate the appropriateness of performance conditions and targets in respect of short- and 
long-term incentive plans. "They must also revisit levels of disclosure, and ensure they are 
prepared for greater shareholder consultation and AGM discussions." (Fin24.com, August 
2010).  However, the overall implication is that policy initiatives in this field need to integrate 
SOEs in a more specific way that would be transparent for the management of executive 
remuneration in such institutions. 
Prior to this research, no empirically validated and reliable study on the governance of 
executive remuneration existed in the context of South African SOEs. However, a 
remuneration guideline for South African SOEs was established in 2007, following proposals 
by the DPE to address issues concerning executive pay.  
In 2011 a new model, which would serve as an improvement on the 2007 model, was 
established. The Minister of Public Enterprises told Parliament's standing committee on public 
accounts in March 2012 that the freezing of executives' pay increases at all state-owned entities 
under his department would be in place until a proper remuneration policy had been put in 
place. The Minister stated that the remuneration of executives was generally quite high and 
“did not contribute to bridging the inequality gaps between the highest paid and lowest paid" 
(Sowetan, 16 March 2012). 
In 2012, the deputy director-general of the DPE presented a progress report on the work that 
had been done by the panel tasked with reviewing executives' pay. The deputy director-general 
mentioned that the panel had taken a provisional report containing a set of recommendations 
on the restructuring of executives' pay and incentives to cabinet (Sowetan, 16 March 2012). 
Among its recommendations was remodelling of short-term incentives, such as once-off 
bonuses, to link them to performance and abolishing long-term incentives for executive 
 directors, such as retention fees. In addition, it was recommended that the size and the asset 
value of each enterprise should not be taken into consideration when setting executive 
compensation. If the recommendations of the panel were accepted, it would mean the size and 
asset value of SOEs would not be accepted as a reason for paying executives at larger South 
African SOEs more than those at smaller South African SOEs. The recommendations made by 
the review panel seemed to suggest that there was no easy solution to challenges experienced 
in executive remuneration in South African SOEs. 
The DPE was also concerned about South African SOEs benchmarking themselves against 
JSE-listed companies in terms of executive remuneration when their mandates were different 
from those of such companies (Sowetan, 25 April 2012). Oberholzer and Theunissen (2012) 
contend that an acceptable benchmarking model is needed to indicate an acceptable level of 
remuneration and to indicate whether a particular executive is being over-or underpaid in the 
context of business-specific elements.  
However, this paper argues that comprehensive and reliable data on executive remuneration 
based on the type of industry are the benchmark SOEs need to support their salary budget 
increase recommendations. This is so since according to Ghose (2011), regardless of levels, 
pay benchmarking is best conducted within industry definitions, as more often than not 
executives progress in their career development to senior positions in the same industry. 
Consequently, it would seem that better pay benchmarking of executive remuneration among 
SOEs can be achieved by comparing how similar institutions measure up to others in similar 
industries with pay increase budgets so that they are able to remain competitive in terms of 
attracting and retaining the best talent. The utilisation of industry as a benchmark can assist in 
shedding some light on the matter and curbing the uncertainty about executive remuneration in 
the context of SOEs. Therefore, the preceding argument leads to the null hypothesis to be tested 
in this article, namely: 
 H0 (1): The distribution of executive remuneration is the same across various categories 
of industry in South African SOEs.  
Furthermore, executives hold different types of jobs and are employed in different occupations 
(Datta Gupta, Poulsen & Villeval, 2013). The importance of a job function in an organisation 
in terms of remuneration can be measured by its comparison to other similar jobs in the job 
family. Job families are usually arranged by functional groups or work categories such as 
administration or customer services, finance, information technology (IT) or personnel, or by 
occupation, for example IT specialists or scientists (Armstrong & Brown, 2001). Armstrong 
and Brown point out that this approach of using job families in remuneration is likely to figure 
where management is of the opinion that different occupations require different reward and/or 
career development practices. Thus, comparison of job functions that belong to a specific job 
family can spell out the distribution of executive remuneration.  Its comparison is intended to 
achieve external equity. 
External equity refers to the fairness of the pay for a specific job in an organisation in 
comparison to the pay for similar jobs in other organisations in the relevant industry 
(Martocchio, 2010). “First, to attract and retain a qualified workforce, the firm must identify 
what the prevailing wage is for each of its jobs. Second and related to the first point, the going 
rate in the labour market becomes the key factor for ascertaining job value or worth and hence, 
external equity is defined as the extent to which the firm’s pay rate for a given job matches the 
prevailing rate for that job in the external labour market” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010: 8). 
Therefore, the preceding discussion leads to the null hypothesis to be tested in this research 
paper, namely: 
H0 (2): The distribution of executive remuneration is the same across various categories of job 
families in South African SOEs.  
 The goal of this study was therefore to establish if there was any difference in the distribution 
of fixed remuneration across various categories of industry and job families in South African 
SOEs.  
This paper contributes to the literature. First, it addresses recent calls in the literature for 
research into the determinants of executive remuneration, especially in the South African 
context (Crotty & Bonorchis, 2006; Lorsch & Khurana, 2010; Maloa & Rajah, 2012; PwC, 
2010; Oberholzer & Theunissen, 2013; Theunissen, 2010; Van Zyl, 2010). Second, the study 
provides evidence of the role of industry and job family in executive remuneration. Third, by 
collecting data from a large sample of South African SOEs, this study provides a broad picture 
of current practices across a group of organisations. 
In what follows, the second section places the discussion in the context of the theoretical 
perspective through which the effect of industry and job family on the distribution of 
remuneration could be explained. The methodology followed in this research is discussed in 
the third section and the findings are presented in the fourth section, followed by the discussion 
and conclusion. 
Contingency theory 
The contingency theory calls for attention to the environmental influences that may affect 
executive remuneration (Robbins & Judge, 2011; Sun, Zhao & Yang, 2010). Contingency 
theory suggests that how executives are compensated is a result of how the organisation would 
like to compare with other similar organisations in the industry. This would include 
consideration of the enterprise industry competition situation, the nature of the industry, 
industry prospects and the tendency of the national legal system of the industry, among other 
elements. 
 Trevor (2011, p. 42) contends that if contingency theory predictions hold true, collectively 
speaking, the effects of the industry (as an element of the environment) might be viewed as a 
contextually independent variable upon which firms’ pay practices, as dependent variables, are 
contingent. If conformity of pay practices is observed in the sample of firms – both at  industry 
level and  firm level – the standard explanation of the normative influence of the ‘industry 
effect’ is both established and powerful. It is the markets and not managers that choose the 
prevailing strategies in a particular environment (Whittington, 1997). This clearly has a bearing 
on the pay trends observed in industry-level findings. 
Methodology and research design 
This was an exploratory research study and empirical research was conducted to gather 
quantitative data. In this study, the various categories of industry (see table 1) and job family 
(see table 4) as elements of executive remuneration in South African SOEs were explored, as 
well as their significance in predicting the distribution of executive remuneration in such 
entities. 
Research approach 
Both descriptive and exploratory research approaches were adopted for the study. The 
emphasis was on the quantification of variables and statistical controls. The literature review 
process was utilised as a point of departure to enable statistical analysis of the collected data. 
Sample 
For the purpose of this research project, the target population consisted of 21 SOEs under 
Schedule 2 organisations as defined in the Public Finance Management Act of 1999 (PFMA). 
Purposive sampling was conducted of executives that fall under the top management team as 
arranged according to Paterson grading E – lower to F – upper (including CEOs, directors and 
 senior managers). On average, each enterprise had 10 executives. The total population size 
investigated was 222 executives. The 21 different SOEs were categorised into seven different 
industries, namely transportation/freight logistics (9.0%), defence (6.3%), energy (12.2%), 
forestry (5.4%), telecommunications (32.9%), development funding (18.0%) and 
aviation/aerospace (16.2%). 
The job family composition of the sample consisted of administration (25.8%), followed by 
operations (21.3%), human resources (12.2%), finance, legal and risk (10%) and strategy, sales 
and marketing (5.9%). The least represented categories of job family were information 
technology (3.6%), followed by strategy and finance (2.7%) and strategy and administration 
(2.3%).  
Data collection 
The empirical data collected consisted of a salary corpus that contained information about the 
remuneration information of the executives. Data items investigated within the salary data 
corpus consisted of the current basic salary of all executives under study.  
Data processing  
The corpus of salary data of all the organisations under study was transferred onto an Excel 
spread sheet. After the data had been captured and edited, the Excel data were then imported 





 Data analysis 
Quantitative analysis was carried out, with salary data of 222 participant executives. The salary 
data were compared based on various categories of job family and industry within which each 
executive and organisation operated. SPSS was used to perform statistical analysis. Data were 
summarised using descriptive statistics (such as mean, standard deviation and range), 
frequency distribution (percentages), correlation coefficients, and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Descriptive statistics were also calculated to describe variables numerically. 
In analysing the relationships among the elements of executive remuneration, the product-
moment correlation (r) was utilised. The researcher decided to set the significance value at a 
95% confidence interval level (p ≤ .05) in order to counter the probability of a type I error.   
Results 
The distribution of executive remuneration was compared across various categories of industry 
and job family within the different SOEs.  
Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics, which involve the means and standard deviations of the frequency data 






 Table 1: Remuneration distribution by industry.  
        














1. Transportation/Freight logistics 20 9.0 407 3318 2606.55 805.253 2538.25 2867.00 3253.50 
2. Defence 14 6.3 706 3488 1471.79 778.675 971.75 1228.00 1616.00 
3. Energy 27 12.2 529 3107 1876.19 756.463 1232.00 1446.00 2642.00 
4. Forestry 12 5.4 533 2265 1195.42 437.403 963.75 1182.00 1372.50 
5. Telecommunications 73 32.9 121 3848 1399.67 821.177 911.00 1316.00 1794.00 
6. Development funding 40 18.0 739 3557 1780.40 588.820 1385.50 1671.50 2033.75 
7. Aviation and aerospace 36 16.2 697 3756 1806.89 651.390 2538.25 2867.00 3253.50 
Total 222  121 3848 1694.50 802.756 971.75 1228.00 1616.00 
 
The sample shows that on average, entities in transportation have the highest distribution of 
pay (2606.55), followed by energy (1876.19), aviation and aerospace (1806.89) and 
development funding (1780.40). The smallest distribution on remuneration occurs in entities 
in forestry (1195.42) and telecommunication (1399.67). Similarly, with regard to the percentile 
range, table 1 also indicates that transportation/freight logistics, aviation and aerospace, as well 
as development funding, are leading in terms of paying executives at the entry, middle and 
upper quartile in the market, respectively. Defence, forestry and telecommunications were the 









Figure 1: Graphical presentation of the independent sample by industry.  
Graphical presentation of the distribution of remuneration based on various categories of 
industry indicates that there are few outliers across different industries, except for energy. 
However, the graph also shows that transportation pays better on average compared to other 
industries, while the industry that pays least is forestry, together with defence. However, in 
order to test the null hypothesis and to determine whether there was a significant difference in 
the distribution of executive remuneration by industry, the Kruskal-Wallis test summary of 
independent samples was conducted. 
 
 Inferential statistics: Kruskal-Wallis test 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was used by firstly determining the prediction power of the distribution 
of remuneration as depicted by the model summary of the variables (see table 2). 
Table 2: Kruskal-Wallis test summary of distribution of remuneration by industry  
Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test Summary 
Total N 222 
Test Statistic 43.940a 
Degree Of Freedom 6 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .000 
a. The test statistic is adjusted for ties. 
 
The summary table indicates that in an analysis of the groups at the 95% confidence interval  
they exhibit statistically significant differences (p=.000). Therefore multiple comparisons were 
performed because the overall test does show significant differences across samples. The 









 Table 3: Pairwise comparison of independent samples by industry  
Pairwise Comparisons of Industry Code 
Sample 1-Sample 2 
Test 
Statistic Std. Error 
Std. Test 
Statistic Sig. Adj. Sig. 
Forestry-Defence 21.714 25.266 .859 .390 1.000 
Forestry-Telecommunications -22.510 20.006 -1.125 .261 1.000 
Forestry-Energy 59.380 22.283 2.665 .008* .162 
Forestry-Aviation and Aerospace -60.014 21.409 -2.803 .005* .106 
Forestry-Development Funding -60.738 21.139 -2.873 .004* .085 
Forestry-Transportation/Freight Logistics 111.900 23.452 4.771 .000* .000 
Defence-Telecommunications -.796 18.739 -.042 .966 1.000 
Defence-Energy -37.665 21.152 -1.781 .075** 1.000 
Defence-Aviation and Aerospace -38.300 20.229 -1.893 .058* 1.000 
Defence-Development Funding -39.023 19.944 -1.957 .050* 1.000 
Defence-Transportation/Freight Logistics 90.186 22.381 4.030 .000* .001 
Telecommunications-Energy 36.869 14.467 2.549 .011* .227 
Telecommunications-Aviation and Aerospace -37.504 13.080 -2.867 .004* .087 
Telecommunications-Development Funding -38.227 12.635 -3.026 .002* .052 
Telecommunications-Transportation/Freight Logistics 89.390 16.210 5.515 .000* .000 
Energy- Aviation and Aerospace -.634 16.351 -.039 .969 1.000 
Energy-Development Funding -1.358 15.997 -.085 .932 1.000 
Energy-1 Transportation/Freight Logistics 52.520 18.948 2.772 .006* .117 
Aviation and Aerospace-Development Funding .724 14.755 .049 .961 1.000 
Aviation and Aerospace-Transportation/Freight Logistics 51.886 17.912 2.897 .004* .079 
Development Funding- Transportation/Freight Logistics 51.163 17.589 2.909 .004* .076 
Each row tests the null hypothesis that the Sample 1 and Sample 2 distributions are the same. 
 Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed. The significance level is .05. 
*Significance level: p < .05 level. 
**Significance level: p < .10 level. 
 
Table 3 indicates that the distributions of fixed remuneration were significantly different across 
categories of industry, using the Kruskal-Wallis test: X²(6) = 43.940, p <0.00. Pairwise 
comparisons using the Kruskal-Wallis test (p = .05) revealed that the distribution of 
remuneration was the same for all categories of industry except between forestry – defence 
(.859), forestry – telecommunication (-1. 125), defence – telecommunications (-.042), energy 
– aviation (-.039), energy – development funding (-.085) and aviation – development funding 
 (.049). It could therefore be concluded that the distribution of executive remuneration is not the 
same across various categories of industry in South African SOEs. The null hypothesis is thus 
rejected. 
Remuneration distribution of the independent sample by job family 
Descriptive statistics and the means and standard deviations of the frequency data according to 
the distribution of remuneration by job family are presented next. 
Table 4: Remuneration distribution by job family  
  
Job family N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
1. Strategy 13 2049.31 753.217 1238 3848 
2. Administration 57 1823.40 993.941 121 3756 
3. Operations 47 1574.87 538.536 652 2666 
4. Human Resources 27 1631.15 737.393 123 3309 
5. Finance 22 1719.55 883.660 146 3557 
6. Information technology 8 2053.88 809.060 1224 3488 
7. Legal  and risk 22 1261.41 614.684 123 2629 
8. Sales  and marketing 13 1799.00 728.474 1049 3060 
9. Research and development 1 1085.00 . 1085 1085 
11. Strategy and admin  5 1310.20 697.837 706 2399 
12. Strategy and finance 6 2192.67 914.275 1338 3510 
Total 221 1696.05 804.246 121 3848 
 
The independent samples of various categories of job family in table 4 show that the 
distribution of remuneration on average was high in strategy and finance (2192.67), 
information technology (2053.88) and strategy (2049.31), followed by administration 
(1823.40), sales and marketing (1799.00)  and finance (1719.55), respectively. The least 
distribution of remuneration by job family was found in human resources (1631.15), operations 
(1574.87), strategy and administration (1310.20), legal and risk (1261.41), and research and 
development (1085.00), respectively.  
 However, in order to test the null hypothesis and to determine whether there was a significant 
difference in the distribution of executive remuneration according to job family, the Kruskal-
Wallis test summary of independent samples was conducted. 









Figure 2: Graphical presentation of remuneration by job family 
Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test Summary 
Total N 221 
Test Statistic 17.193a,b 
Degree Of Freedom 10 
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test) .070 
a. The test statistic is adjusted for ties. 
b. Multiple comparisons are not performed because the overall test does 
not show significant differences across samples. 
 According to the hypothesis test summary using independent samples to conduct the Kruskal-
Wallis test, the variables in each model fell above the accepted level of significance (p< = 0.05) 
and consequently, multiple comparisons were not performed because the overall test at (p< = 
0.07)  did not show significant differences across samples. It can thus, statistically and 
significantly, be concluded that the distribution of remuneration is the same across various 
categories of job family in all South African SOEs under study. The null hypothesis is therefore 
accepted. 
Discussion and conclusion 
An investigation into the distribution of executive remuneration based on various categories of 
industry and job family provides insight into the research and practice in establishing executive 
remuneration in South African SOEs. The result, based on the initial percentile distribution of 
remuneration according to various categories of industry, seems to suggest on the one hand 
that industries including transportation/freight logistics, aviation and aerospace and 
development funding were leading in terms of the distribution of executive remuneration at the 
entry, middle and upper quartile in the market. On the other hand, the distribution of executive 
remuneration was lowest in defence, forestry and telecommunications. The distribution of 
remuneration based on the percentile rank seems to imply that it would be ideal for an executive 
who aims at a high package relative to industry to work for a South African SOE in the 
transportation/freight industry rather in telecommunication.  Similarly, it would seem ideal for 
such an executive to work for an institution in aviation and aerospace rather than one in 
defence. However, the statistics were only based on independent treatment of the sample.  
The actual testing and analysis of the null hypothesis, using pairwise comparison, revealed that 
the distribution of remuneration was not the same in all categories of industry, except between 
forestry – defence, forestry – telecommunication, defence – telecommunication, energy – 
 aviation, energy – development funding, and aviation – development funding. The results seem 
to imply that executives who moved from the aforementioned paired industries would expect 
a change in their executive package, which could be either positive or negative in terms of 
salary. 
However, the results also indicated that there was no difference in the distribution of 
remuneration across various categories of job family in South African SOEs. It would appear 
that job family does not have an effect on the distribution of executive remuneration in the 
different SOEs. Thus, the finding is that it would be a challenge to use similar or comparable 
jobs within the same job family as differentiators in determining executive remuneration.  
The findings of the research make an important contribution to the determinants of executive 
remuneration and extend the scope of the theory and empirical research by showing the strong 
predictive value of the one variable, namely the type of industry, on executive remuneration as 
being more informative compared to job family. Findings of the research seem consistent with 
previous literature (Trevor, 2010, Ghose, 2011) and the contingency theory, which both 
contend that the type of industry is the main determinant of executive remuneration. In 
addition, findings in this study are consistent with previous studies (Ang, Nagel & Yang, 2013; 
Bizjak, Lemmon, & Nguyen, 2011; Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2008; Faulkender & Yang, 
2010) that support industry as the benchmark for executive remuneration and also assert that 
executive pay is benchmarked against industry peers of comparable size to justify CEO pay. 
These findings are welcome for researchers, as they provide empirical justification for using, 
combining and comparing variables as determinants of executive remuneration as researched 
in this study. Industry, as a pay benchmarking criterion in executive remuneration and as 
investigated in this study, may have significant implications for remuneration philosophy that 
guides the setting and implementation of executive remuneration in the context of SOEs. The 
 empirical data about the relevance of the type of industry within SOEs prove that executive 
remuneration in SOEs cannot be appropriately determined without understanding the 
implication of the type of industry to which an enterprise belongs. However, further research 
is needed to investigate what makes the various categories of industry different, warranting the 
difference in pay, since they are all SOEs.  
Because of the lack of a proper guide to executive remuneration, some South African SOEs are 
challenged to the extent that maladministration and corruption taint the manner in which 
executive remuneration is determined and managed. From a public policy research perspective 
it would be rewarding to assess, besides the type of industry as a criterion for determining 
executive remuneration, the law creation processes and to explore why the remuneration 
guidelines for SOEs seem remote from those that govern the private sector (Papenfuß & 
Schmidt, 2015). 
In an international comparative perspective, the discussion about principles of good and 
responsible public corporate governance, scholars and practitioners have suggested and 
reinforced the need for transparent disclosure of top-management compensation (OECD 2005; 
Papenfuß & Schmidt, 2015; Whincop 2005, p. 227). Although the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) governance codes seem to serve only as a reference 
point for many countries developing their own national corporate governance codes, the OECD 
is nevertheless an important point of departure when determining executive remuneration.  
However, a move towards harmonisation of the legal status of SOEs with companies in the 
private sector is beginning to take place, which in turn could facilitate a more systematic use 
of corporate governance instruments (PwC, 2015). For instance, the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards Board is in the process of clarifying how companies that are owned by 
 the government should be defined. This will determine which financial reporting standards 
apply (PwC, 2015). 
With regard to future research gaining comparative empirical insights about more countries, 
especially in terms of how industry as a benchmark for determining executive remuneration is 
treated, would be of particular interest. Most research on SOEs seems to be done in western 
developed countries. In comparison, there is still lack of empirical research on SOEs in 
developing countries such as South Africa. Strengthening comparative approaches in this field 
seems especially valuable as a means of gathering new insights to improve the management of 
public service institutions such as SOEs. However, whether the type of industry as a criterion 
in benchmarking executive remuneration can be applied in practice in the same way in all 
countries remains to be seen. 
Likewise, the result for job family revealed that the distribution of executive remuneration 
across various categories of job family was non-significant as a determinant of executive 
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